Book Review (reviewing Eskridge, William N., J., Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (1988)) by Posner, Richard A.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1988
Book Review (reviewing Eskridge, William N., J.,
Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and
the Creation of Public Policy (1988))
Richard A. Posner
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard A. Posner, "Book Review (reviewing Eskridge, William N., J., Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of
Public Policy (1988))," 74 Virginia Law Review 1567 (1988).
BOOK REVIEW
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY. By William N. Eskridge, Jr. and
Philip P. Frickey. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minnesota, 1988, 937
pages.
Reviewed by Richard A. Posner*
The Eskridge and Frickey casebook on legislation is far and away the best
set of teaching materials on the subject of legislation that has ever been pub-
lished. Moreover, it has the potential to alter the law school curriculum; of
few casebooks can that be said.
The enormous growth of American government in this century has gener-
ated an explosion of legislation; as a result, the creation and interpretation of
statutes are now paramount concerns of the legal profession. Law schools
recognize this to the extent of offering numerous courses built around stat-
utes-courses in antitrust, labor, copyright, bankruptcy, pension law, wel-
fare, employment discrimination, and the like. But about the nature of the
legislative process, and about the enormous difficulties of statutory interpre-
tation, the typical law school curriculum is practically silent. Courses that
deal with particular statutes, such as the courses I have named, often treat
the legislature as a black box out of which a text somehow emerges and treat
interpretation as a straightforward process of making the statute conform to
some reasonable (the instructor's?) conception of its purposes. That the
processes of statutory creation and interpretation might be fascinating and
deeply problematic topics in their own right is a possibility rarely glimpsed.
Even more troubling, graduates of these courses go on to be law clerks and
eventually judges and in these capacities write about legislation and its inter-
pretation with the most astonishing naivete, compounding endless bromides
about the will of the people as expressed in legislation with the jejune meth-
ods of interpretation embodied in the canons of statutory construction.
What is needed is a good course on legislation. Though there have always
been courses on legislation, they have rarely been successful and have never
ranked alongside constitutional law or first-year courses in the common law
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School.
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fields. There are at least three reasons for this failure. First, few law profes-
sors can teach without cases, and it is not obvious how to teach legislation
from cases. Second, it is unclear how one can discuss in a single course
statutes that belong to different substantive areas of law not all of which the
students will have studied. Third, it is unclear what it is that lawyers, as
distinct from political scientists or even economists, have to say about
legislation.
Eskridge and Frickey are the first authors of teaching materials on legisla-
tion to offer credible solutions to all three of these problems. They are able
to do this, in part, because the first and third problems are linked. Although
little about legislation lends itself to case treatment, statutory interpretation
does. And fortunately for Eskridge and Frickey, statutory interpretation is
one of the most important topics in legislation. Another bit of good fortune
for them is the enormous variety of interesting and accessible theoretical
discussions of the legislative process, with the result that the areas of legisla-
tion that cannot be taught by the case method can be taught by presenting
excerpts from theoretical discussions. Not only are these discussions inter-
esting but they are inconsistent with each other, so that they can easily be
presented in a dialogical or adversarial format, the better to hold the reader's
interest. There is the interest-group approach of economists and political
scientists, there is public choice theory, there is the "New Republicanism"
(as expounded by Michelman and Sunstein, for example), there is the radical
skepticism of Critical Legal Studies; and at the other end of the political
spectrum there is the conservative school of "plain meaning" and "original
intentions," there are the literary analogizers (Dworkin, Fish), the philoso-
phers (Gadamer, for example), the legal realists, and others. The skillful
casebook editor-and Eskridge and Frickey are skillful casebook editors-
can meld these voices into an interesting if atonal chorus that will sound as
good as a sequence of appellate opinions. The academic commentaries,
moreover, provide illuminating counterpoint to the opinions on statutory
interpretation, where judges are seen to be wrestling unself-consciously with
the same problems that engage the scholars on a theoretical level. Much like
conflict of laws, statutory interpretation is an area where the innovations
come mainly from the academy, and where an interesting course can be built
around the conflicts between spokesmen for rival academic approaches, as
well as around the conflicts between different strains in the case law.
The editors solve the second problem-that students may not know the
substantive law at issue in important cases-by including relatively few
cases. Regarding the cases they do include, Eskridge and Frickey either pro-
vide so extensive a background that the student can feel comfortable without
having studied the field, or select opinions the legal setting of which is rela-
tively plain.
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Let me describe in slightly more detail how the editors have met the chal-
lenges I have set forth. The first 100 or so pages are a masterful introduction
to the subject. There is a blow-by-blow description of the deliberations on
and enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-a story interesting in itself,
resonant for students, and apt for conveying the mechanics of the legislative
process. The student is then invited to consider alternative theories of the
legislative process, one stressing the role of interest groups, and another tak-
ing a more up-beat "public interest" approach. Finally, the student applies
his new learning to United Steelworkers v. Weber,1 where the Supreme Court
interpreted title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2 seemingly in the teeth of
the statute, to permit an affirmative action program.
Next comes a longish and, to me, dullish chapter on what might be called
the law of legislation-the Voting Rights Act, gerrymandering, regulation of
campaign finance, and so forth. There are many interesting issues here, but
this part of the book could just as well be a chapter of a casebook on consti-
tutional law, civil rights, or election law. It reads much like a conventional
casebook and focuses on problems that are marginal to legislation. As we
shall see, the alternation between a chapter dealing with the central
problems of the field and a chapter dealing with a peripheral topic rich in
cases is a marked feature of the book.
Chapter 3 returns to the themes announced in Chapter 1. It deals system-
atically with the fundamental question of the authenticity of statutes as
sources of public policy. If, as argued by several scholars, statutes merely
register the compromises of interest groups, then legislation is hardly a
source of wisdom to which courts should resort when faced with new
problems outside the narrow compass of a specific statute. And perhaps, if
this is so, courts should also be less reluctant than they are now to revise
statutory interpretations. Maybe legislatures can not be trusted to engage in
constructive dialogue with courts or to correct erroneous judicial interpreta-
tions with amendatory statutes. The chapter explores such issues with a
judicious balance of cases and theoretical discussion.
Chapter 4, however, is patterned on Chapter 2. It considers constitutional
problems in the legislative process-for example, the constraints that the due
process clause may place on the procedures of legislatures and on the sub-
stance of legislation. What I said about Chapter 2 applies equally here.
Chapter 5 is a fine treatment of the enforcement of statutes, with particu-
lar emphasis on administrative regulation and the implication of private
rights of action in statutes. These are well-worn topics, of course, but they
are freshened up by being approached in the theoretical framework that has
I 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
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slowly been emerging in the book. Chapter 6, though, returns to the mold of
Chapters 2 and 4, being primarily concerned with the constitutional
problems involved in the referendum and other experiments in "direct
democracy."
Chapter 7 is a huge (some 250 pages-almost thirty percent of the book,
exclusive of appendices) and utterly worthwhile treatment of statutory inter-
pretation. Eskridge and Frickey have flawlessly selected these cases, though
in fairness it should be mentioned that some of the chapter's best material
comes from the section on statutory interpretation in the Hart and Sacks
Legal Process book,3 material that Professor Sacks generously permitted
Eskridge and Frickey to reprint. In this as in all the chapters, the cases are
well edited and the notes are clear, brief, and to the point. A slight disap-
pointment, however, is the omission of philosophical approaches to interpre-
tation. A number of passages (none of excessive length) by Aristotle,
Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, E.D. Hirsch, Stanley Fish, and others
could have been included with profit.4 The editors include a fascinating case
on whether tomatoes are "fruits" or "vegetables" for purposes of the duties
on imported food products. 5 It is natural to suppose that the answer might
be found in a book on biology, but that would surely be the wrong place to
look and philosophical analysis of the problem of meaning would help show
why. In general, philosophy could have received more play in this book
than it does, but this is a question for editorial discretion.
Chapter 8 is a minute (fifteen pages), perfunctory, and easily dispensable
discussion of statutory drafting. Chapter 9, also brief, deals with suggested
solutions to statutory obsolescence: a problem that should win converts to
euthanasia.
One senses that the authors ran out of steam after completing their monu-
mental chapter on statutory interpretation. But this is of no importance.
The strong and central chapters-Chapters 1, 3, 5, and 7-are quite enough
for a course.
3 H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 1144-47 (tent. ed. 1958).
4 See, e.g., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. V, § 10; R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of
History 65 (1946); H. Gadamer, Truth and Method 291-94, 471 (1975); E.D. Hirsch, Jr.,
Validity in Interpretation 124-25 (1967); F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power 560, at 302-03 (W.
Kaufmann & R. Hollingdale trans. 1967); R. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in
Scheiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer 84-97 (1969); L. Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations: The English Text of the Third Edition 431, at 128e (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans. 1968). In fairness to Eskridge and Frickey, it should be noted that they do
include an illuminating passage by the neglected German-American hermeneuticist, Francis
Lieber, author of Legal and Philosophical Hermeneutics (1839). See W. Eskridge & P.
Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 574-75
(1988).
5 Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
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With the Eskridge and Frickey book in print, law schools no longer have
an excuse for relegating legislation to the periphery of the law school curric-
ulum. The casebook makes the course teachable; it demonstrates not only
that there is much to be said of great interest to the legal profession about
the theory of legislation and its interpretation, but also that this material can
be conveyed effectively with well-chosen cases and academic commentary.
The book has done for legislation what Hart and Sacks did for legal process,
or Hart and Wechsler for federal courts: it has demonstrated the existence of
a subject.
